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Abstract. The ASASA construction is a new design scheme introduced at Asiacrypt 2014 by
Biryukov, Bouillaguet and Khovratovich. Its versatility was illustrated by building two public-key
encryption schemes, a secret-key scheme, as well as super S-box subcomponents of a white-box
scheme. However one of the two public-key cryptosystems was recently broken at Crypto 2015
by Gilbert, Plût and Treger. As our main contribution, we propose a new algebraic key-recovery
attack able to break at once the secret-key scheme as well as the remaining public-key scheme,
in time complexity 263 and 239 respectively (the security parameter is 128 bits in both cases).
Furthermore, we present a second attack of independent interest on the same public-key scheme,
which heuristically reduces the problem of breaking the scheme to an LPN instance with tractable
parameters. This allows key recovery in time complexity 256. Finally, as a side result, we outline
a very efficient heuristic attack on the white-box scheme, which breaks instances claiming 64 bits
of security under one minute on a laptop computer.
Keywords: ASASA, Algebraic Cryptanalysis, Multivariate Cryptography, LPN
1 Introduction
The idea of creating a public-key cryptosystem by obfuscating a secret-key cipher was proposed by
Diffie and Hellman in 1976, in the same seminal paper that introduced the idea of public-key encryption
[DH76]. While the RSA cryptosystem was introduced only a year later, creating a public-key scheme
based on symmetric components has remained an open challenge to this day. The interest of this
problem is not merely historical: beside increasing the variety of available public-key schemes, one
can hope that a solution may help bridge the performance gap between public-key and secret-key
cryptosystems, or at least offer new trade-offs in that regard.
Multivariate cryptography is one way to achieve this goal. This area of research dates back to the
1980’s [MI88, FD86], and has been particularly active in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s [Pat95, Pat96,
RP97, FJ03, . . . ]. Many of the proposed public-key cryptosystems build an encryption function from
a structured, easily invertible polynomial, which is then scrambled by affine maps (or similarly simple
transformations) applied to its input and output to produce the encryption function.
This approach might be aptly described as an ASA structure, which should be read as the com-
position of an affine map “A”, a nonlinear transformation of low algebraic degree “S” (not necessarily
made up of smaller S-boxes), and another affine layer “A”. The secret key is the full description of
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the three maps A,S,A′, which makes computing both ASA′ and (ASA′)−1 easy. The public key is
the function ASA′ as a whole, which is described in a generic manner by providing the polynomial
expression of each output bit in the input bits (or group of n bits if the scheme operates on F2n). Thus
the owner of the secret key is able to encrypt and decrypt at high speed (provided that S admits an
efficient expression). The downside is slow public key operations, and a large key size.
The ASASA construction. Historically, most attempts to build public-key encryption schemes based
on the above principle have been ill-fated [FJ03, BFP11, DGS07, DFSS07, WBDY98, . . . ]1. However
several new ideas to build multivariate schemes were recently introduced by Biryukov, Bouillaguet and
Khovratovich at Asiacrypt 2014 [BBK14]. The paradigm federating these new ideas is the so-called
ASASA structure: that is, combining two quadratic mappings S by interleaving random affine layers
A. With quadratic S layers, the overall scheme has degree 4, so the polynomial description provided
by the public key remains of reasonable size.
This is very similar to the 2R scheme by Patarin [PG97], which fell victim to several attacks
[Bih00, DFKYZD99], including a powerful decomposition attack [DFKYZD99, FP06] (later developed
in a general context by Faugère et al. [FvzGP10, FP09a, FP09b]). The general course of this attack is
to differentiate the encryption function, and observe that the resulting polynomials in the input bits
live in a “small” space entirely determined by the first ASA layers. This essentially allows the scheme
to be broken down into its two ASA sub-components, which are easily analyzed once isolated. A later
attempt to circumvent this and other attacks by truncating the output of the cipher proved insecure
against the same technique [FP06] — roughly speaking truncating does not prevent the derivative
polynomials from living in too small a space.
In order to thwart attacks including the decomposition technique, the authors of [BBK14] propose
to go in the opposite direction: instead of truncating the cipher, a perturbation is added, consisting
in new random polynomials of degree four added at fixed positions, prior to the last affine layer2.
The idea is that these new random polynomials will be spread over the whole output of the cipher
by the last affine layer. When differentiating, the “noise” introduced by the perturbation polynomials
is intended to drown out the information about the first quadratic layer otherwise carried by the
derivative polynomials, and thus foil the decomposition attack.
Based on this idea, two public-key cryptosystems are proposed. One uses random quadratic ex-
panding S-boxes as nonlinear components, while the other relies on the χ function, most famous for
its use in the SHA-3 winner Keccak. However the first scheme was broken at Crypto 2015 by a
decomposition attack [GPT15]: the number of perturbation polynomials turned out to be too small
to prevent this approach. This leaves open the question of the robustness of the other cryptosystem,
based on χ, to which we answer negatively.
Black-box ASASA. Besides public-key cryptosystems, the authors of [BBK14] also propose a secret-
key (“black-box”) scheme based on the ASASA structure, showcasing its versatility. While the structure
is the same, the context is entirely different. This black-box scheme is in fact the exact counterpart of
the SASAS structure analyzed by Biryukov and Shamir [BS01]: it is a block cipher operating on 128-bit
inputs; each affine layer is a random affine map on F1282 , while the nonlinear layers are composed of 16
random 8-bit S-boxes3. The secret key is the description of the three affine layers, together with the
tables of all S-boxes.
In some sense, the “public key” is still the encryption function as a whole; however it is only ac-
cessible in a black-box way through known or chosen-plaintext or ciphertext attacks, as any standard
secret-key scheme. A major difference however is that the encryption function can be easily distin-
guished from a random permutation because the constituent S-boxes have algebraic degree at most 7,
1 The HFEv- variant used in Quartz [PGC01] seems to be an exception in this regard.
2 A similar idea was used in [Din04].
3 Other choices for the number and size of S-boxes are obviously possible, but we focus on the instance
proposed by Biryukov et al.
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and hence the whole function has degree at most 49; in particular, it sums up to zero over any cube of
dimension 50. The security claim is that the secret key cannot be recovered, with a security parameter
evaluated at 128 bits.
White-box ASASA. The structure of the black-box scheme is also used as a basis for several white-
box proposals. In that setting, a symmetric (black-box) ASASA cipher with small block (e.g. 16 bits)
is used as a super S-box in a design with a larger block. A white-box user is given the super S-box
as a table. The secret information consists in a much more compact description of the super S-box in
terms of alternating linear and nonlinear layers. The security of the ASASA design is then expected to
prevent a white-box user from recovering the secret information.
1.1 Our contribution
Algebraic attack on the secret-key and χ-based public-key schemes. Despite the difference in
nature between the χ-based public-key scheme and the black-box scheme, we present a new algebraic
key-recovery attack able to break both schemes at once. This attack does not rely on a decomposition
technique. Instead, it may be regarded as exploiting the relatively low degree of the encryption function,
coupled with the low diffusion of nonlinear layers. Furthermore, in the case of the public-key scheme,
the attack applies regardless of the amount of perturbation. Thus, contrary to the attack of [GPT15],
there is no hope of patching the scheme by increasing the number of perturbation polynomials. As
for the secret-key scheme, our attack may be seen as a counterpart to the cryptanalysis of SASAS in
[BS01], and is structural in the same sense.
While the same attack applies to both schemes, their respective bottlenecks for the time complexity
come from different stages of the attack. For the χ scheme, the time complexity is dominated by the
need to compute the kernel of a binary matrix of dimension 213, which can be evaluated to 239 basic
linear operations4. As for the black-box scheme, the time complexity is dominated by the need to
encrypt 263 chosen plaintexts, and the data complexity follows.
This attack actually only peels off the last linear layer of the scheme, reducing ASASA to ASAS.
In the case of the black-box scheme, the remaining layers can be recovered in negligible time using
Biryukov and Shamir’s techniques [BS01]. In the case of the χ scheme, removing the remaining lay-
ers poses non-trivial algorithmic challenges (such as how to efficiently recover quadratic polynomials
A,B,C ∈ F2[X1, . . . , Xn]/〈X2i −Xi〉, given A + B · C), and some of the algorithms we propose may
be of independent interest. Nevertheless, in the end the remaining layers are peeled off and the secret
key is recovered in time complexity negligible relative to the cost of removing the first layer.
We view the attack above as our main result. In addition, we offer two secondary contributions.
LPN-based attack on the χ scheme. As a second contribution, we present an entirely different
attack, dedicated to the χ public-key scheme. This attack exploits the fact that each bit at the output
of χ is “almost linear” in the input: indeed the nonlinear component of each bit is a single product,
which is equal to zero with probability 3/4 over all inputs. Based on this property, we are able to
heuristically reduce the problem of breaking the scheme to an LPN-like instance with easy-to-solve
parameters. By LPN-like instance, we mean an instance of a problem very close to the Learning
Parity with Noise problem (LPN), on which typical LPN-solving algorithms such as the Blum-Kalai-
Wasserman algorithm (BKW) [BKW03] are expected to immediately apply. The time complexity of
this approach is higher than the previous one, and can be evaluated at 256 basic operations. However
it showcases a different weakness of the χ scheme, providing a different insight into the security of
ASASA constructions. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the security of another recent multivariate
4 In practice, vector instructions operating on 128-bit inputs would mean that the meaningful size of the
matrix is 213−7 = 26, and in this context the number of basic linear operations would be much lower. We
also disregard asymptotic improvements such as the Strassen or Coppersmith-Winograd algorithms and their
variants. The main point is that the time complexity is quite low — well within practical reach.
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scheme, presented by Huang et al. at PKC 2012 [HLY12], was also reduced to an easy instance of LWE
[Reg05], which is an extension of LPN, in [AFF+14]5.
Heuristic attack on the white-box scheme. Finally as a side result, we describe a key-recovery
attack on white-box ASASA. The attack technique is unrelated to the previous ones, and it relies
on heuristics rather than a theoretical model. On the other hand it is very effective on the smallest
white-box instances of [BBK14] (with a security level of 64 bits), which we break under a minute on
a laptop computer. Thus it seems that the security offered by small-block ASASA is much lower than
anticipated.
1.2 Related Work.
The first attack on an ASASA scheme from [BBK14] was a decomposition attack targeting the ex-
panding public-key scheme [GPT15], as mentioned in the introduction. Our techniques are entirely
different, and target all ASASA schemes from [BBK14] except the one already broken in [GPT15].
Another attack on white-box schemes was found independently by Dinur, Dunkelman, Kranz and
Leander [DDKL15]. Their approach focuses on small-block ASASA instances, and is thus only applicable
to the white-box scheme of [BBK14]. Section 5 of [DDKL15] is essentially the same attack as ours,
minus the heuristic improvements from our Section 6.3, which allow us, for instance, to break the 20-
bit instance in practice with very limited means using this approach. On the other hand, the authors
of [DDKL15] present other methods to attack small-block ASASA instances that are less reliant on
heuristics, but as efficient as our heuristically improved variant, and thus provide a better theoretical
basis for understanding small-block ASASA, as used in the white-box scheme of [BBK14].
A very interesting follow-up work by Alex Biryukov and Dmitry Khovratovich shows that our attack
on black-box ASASA can be extended to longer structures, even SASASASAS for some parameters
[BK15]. The main obstacle is the degree of the overall function, which is bounded using results by
Boura and Canteaut on the degree of composite functions [BC13].
1.3 Structure of the article
Section 3 provides a brief description of the three ASASA schemes under attack. In Section 4, we present
our main attack, as applied to the secret-key (“black-box”) scheme. In particular, an overview of the
attack is given in Section 4.1. The attack is then adapted to the χ public-key scheme in Section 5.1,
while the LPN-based attack on the same scheme is presented in Section 5.2. Finally, our attack on the
white-box scheme is presented in Section 6.
1.4 Implementation
Implementations of our attacks have been made available at:
http://asasa.gforge.inria.fr/
2 Notation and preliminaries
The sign 4= denotes an equality by definition. |S| denotes the cardinality of a set S. The log() function
denotes logarithm in base 2.
5 On this topic, the authors of [BBK14] note that “the full application of LWE to multivariate cryptography
is still to be explored in the future”.
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Binary vectors. We write F2 for the finite field with two elements. The set of n-bit vectors is
denoted interchangeably by {0, 1}n or Fn2 . However the vectors are always regarded as elements of
Fn2 with respect to addition + and dot product 〈·|·〉. In particular, addition should be understood as
bitwise XOR. The canonical basis of Fn2 is denoted by e0, . . . , en−1.
For any v ∈ {0, 1}n, vi denotes the i-th coordinate of v. In this context, the index i is always computed
modulo n, so v0 = vn and so forth. Likewise, if F is a mapping into {0, 1}n, Fi denotes the i-th bit of
the output of F .
For a ∈ {0, 1}n, 〈F |a〉 is a shorthand for the function x 7→ 〈F (x)|a〉.
For any v ∈ {0, 1}n, bvck denotes the truncation (v0, . . . , vk−1) of v to its first k coordinates.
For any bit b, b stands for b+ 1.
Derivative of a binary function. For F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n and δ ∈ {0, 1}m, we define the derivative
of F along δ as ∂F/∂δ 4= x 7→ F (x)+F (x+δ). We write ∂dF/∂v0 . . . ∂vd−1
4= ∂(. . . (∂F/∂v0) . . . )/∂vd−1
for the order-d derivative along v0, . . . , vd−1 ∈ {0, 1}m. For convenience we may write F ′ instead of
∂F/∂v when v is clear from the context; likewise for F ′′.
The degree of Fi is its degree as an element of F2[X0, . . . , Xm−1]/〈X2i −Xi〉 in the binary input variables.
The degree of F is the maximum of the degrees of the Fi’s.
Cube. A cube of dimension d in {0, 1}n is simply an affine subspace of dimension d. The terminology
comes from [DS09]. Note that summing a function F over a cube C of dimension d, i.e. computing∑
c∈C F (c), amounts to computing the value of an order-d differential of F at a certain point: it is
equal to ∂dF/∂v0 . . . ∂vd−1(a) for a, (vi) such that C = a+ span{v0, . . . , vd−1}. In particular if F has
degree d, then it sums up to zero over any cube of dimension d+ 1.
Bias. For any probability p ∈ [0, 1], the bias of p is |2p− 1|. Note that the bias is sometimes defined
as |p − 1/2| in the literature. Our choice of definition makes the formulation of the Piling-up Lemma
more convenient:
Lemma 1 (Piling-up Lemma [Mat94]). For X1, . . . , Xn independent random binary variables with
respective biases b1, . . . , bn, the bias of X =
∑
Xi is b =
∏
bi.
Learning Parity with Noise (LPN). The LPN problem was introduced in [BKW03], and may be
stated as follows: given (A,As+ e), find s, where:
– s ∈ Fn2 is a uniformly random secret vector.
– A ∈ FN×n2 is a uniformly random binary matrix.
– e ∈ FN2 is an error vector, whose coordinates are chosen according to a Bernoulli distribution with
parameter p.
3 Description of ASASA schemes
3.1 Presentation and notations
ASASA is a general design scheme for public or secret-key ciphers (or cipher components). An ASASA
cipher is composed of 5 interleaved layers: the letter A represents an affine layer, and the letter S
represents a nonlinear layer (not necessarily made up of smaller S-boxes). Thus the cipher may be
pictured as in Fig. 1.
We borrow the notation of [GPT15] and write the encryption function F as:
F = Az ◦ Sy ◦Ay ◦ Sx ◦Ax
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′
z z′
Ax Sx Ay Sy Az
Fig. 1. The ASASA structure.
Moreover, x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) is used to denote the input of the cipher; x′ is the output of the first affine
layer Ax; and so on as in Fig. 1. The variables x′i, yi, etc., will often be viewed as polynomials over the
input bits (x0, . . . , xn−1). Similarly, F denotes the whole encryption function, while F y = Sx◦Ax is the
partial encryption function that maps the input x to the intermediate state y, and likewise F x′ = Ax,
F y
′ = Ay ◦ Sx ◦Ax, etc.
One secret-key (“black-box”) and two public-key ASASA ciphers are presented in [BBK14]. The
secret-key and public-key variants are quite different in nature, even though our main attack applies
to both. We now present, in turn, the black-box construction, and the public-key variant based on χ.
3.2 Description of the black-box scheme
It is worth noting that the following ASASA scheme is the exact counterpart of the SASAS structure
analyzed by Biryukov and Shamir [BS01], with the affine layer taking the place of the S-box one and
vice-versa. Black-box ASASA is a secret-key encryption scheme, parameterized by m, the size of the
S-boxes and k, the number of S-boxes. Let n = km be the block size of the scheme (in bits). The
overall structure of the cipher follows the ASASA construction, where the layers are as follows:
– Ax, Ay, Az are a random invertible affine mappings Fn2 → Fn2 . Without loss of generality, the
mappings can be considered purely linear, because the affine constant can be integrated into the
preceding or following S-box layer. In the remainder we assume the mappings to be linear.
– Sx, Sy are S-box layers. Each S-box layer consists in the application of k parallel random invertible
m-bit S-boxes.
All linear layers and all S-boxes are chosen uniformly and independently at random among invertible
elements.
In the concrete instance of [BBK14], each S-box layer contains k = 16 S-boxes over m = 8 bits
each, so that the scheme operates on blocks of n = 128 bits. The secret key consists in three n-bit
matrices and 2k m-bit S-boxes, so the key size is 3 · n2 + 2k · m2m-bit long. For this instance, this
amounts to 14 KB.
It should be pointed out that the scheme is not IND-CPA secure. Indeed, an 8-bit invertible S-box
has algebraic degree (at most) 7, so the overall scheme has algebraic degree (at most) 49. Thus, the
sum of ciphertexts on entries spanning a cube of dimension 50 is necessarily zero. As a result the
security claim in [BBK14] is only that the secret key cannot be recovered, with a security parameter
of 128 bits.
3.3 Description of the white-box scheme
As another application of the symmetric ASASA scheme, Biryukov et al. propose its use as a basis for
designing white-box block ciphers. In a nutshell, their idea is to use ASASA to create small ciphers of,
say, 16-bit blocks and to use them as super S-boxes in e.g. a substitution-permutation network (SPN).
Users of the cipher in the white-box model are given access to super S-boxes in the form a table, which
allows them to encrypt and decrypt at will. Yet if the small ciphers used in building the super S-boxes
are secure, one cannot efficiently recover their keys even when given access to their entire codebook,
meaning that white-box users cannot extract a more compact description of the super S-boxes from
their tables. This achieves weak white-box security as defined by Biryukov et al. [BBK14]:
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Definition 1 (Key equivalence [BBK14]). Let E : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a (symmetric)
block cipher. E(k) is called the equivalent key set of k if for any k′ ∈ E(k) one can efficiently compute
E′ such that ∀ p E(k, p) = E′(k′, p).
Definition 2 (Weak white-box T -security [BBK14]). Let E : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a
(symmetric) block cipher. W(E)(k, ·) is said to be a T -secure weak white-box implementation of E(k, ·)
if ∀ p W(E)(k, p) = E(k, p) and if it is computationally expensive to find k′ ∈ E(k) of length less than
T bits when given full access to W(E)(k, ·).
Example 1. If S16 is a secure cipher with 16-bit blocks, then the full codebook of S16(k, ·) as a table
is a 220-secure weak white-box implementation of S16(k, ·).
For their instantiations, Biryukov et al. propose to use several super S-boxes of different sizes,
among others:
– A 16-bit ASASA16 where the nonlinear permutations S are made of the parallel application of two
8-bit S-boxes, with conjectured security of 64 bits.
– A 24-bit ASASA24 where the nonlinear permutations S are made of the parallel application of three
8-bit S-boxes, with conjectured security of 128 bits.
3.4 Description of the χ-based public-key scheme
The χ mapping was introduced by Daemen [Dae95] and later used for several cryptographic construc-
tions, including the SHA-3 competition winner Keccak. The mapping χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined
by:
χi(a) = ai + ai+1ai+2
The χ-based ASASA scheme presented in [BBK14] is a public-key encryption scheme operating on
127-bit inputs, the odd size coming from the fact that χ is only invertible on inputs of odd length. The
encryption function may be written as:
F = Az ◦ (P + χ ◦Ay ◦ χ ◦Ax)
where:
– Ax, Ay, Az are random invertible affine mappings F1272 → F1272 . In the remainder we will decompose
Ax as a linear map Lx followed by the addition of a constant Cx, and likewise for Ay, Az.
– χ is as above.
– P is the perturbation. It is a mapping {0, 1}127 → {0, 1}127. For 24 output bits at a fixed position,
it is equal to a random polynomial of degree 4. On the remaining 103 bits, it is equal to zero.
Since χ has degree only 2, the overall degree of the encryption function is 4. The public key of the
scheme is the encryption function itself, given in the form of degree 4 polynomials in the input bits,
for each output bit. The private key is the triplet of affine maps (Ax, Ay, Az).
Due to the perturbation, the scheme is not actually invertible. To circumvent this, some redun-
dancy is required in the plaintext, and the 24 bits of perturbation must be guessed during decryption.
The correct guess is determined first by checking whether the resulting plaintext has the required re-
dundancy, and second by recomputing the ciphertext from the tentative plaintext and checking that it
matches. This is not relevant to our attack, and we refer the reader to [BBK14] for more information.
4 Structural attack on black-box ASASA
Our goal in this section is to recover the secret key of the black-box ASASA scheme, in a chosen-plaintext
model. For this purpose, we begin by peeling off the last linear layer, Az. Once Az is removed, we obtain
an ASAS structure, which can be broken using Biryukov and Shamir’s techniques [BS01] in negligible
time. Thus the critical step is the first one.
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4.1 Attack overview
Before progressing further, it is important to observe that the secret key of the scheme is not uniquely
defined. In particular, we are free to compose the input and output of any S-box with a linear mapping
of our choosing, and use the result in place of the original S-box, as long as we modify the surrounding
linear layers accordingly. Thus, S-boxes are essentially defined up to linear equivalence. When we claim
to recover the secret key, this should be understood as recovering an equivalent secret key; that is, any
secret key that results in an encryption function identical to the black-box instance under attack.
In particular, in order to remove the last linear layer of the scheme, it is enough to determine,
for each S-box, the m-dimensional subspace corresponding to its image through the last linear layer.
Indeed, we are free to pick any basis of this m-dimensional subspace, and assert that each element of
this basis is equal to one bit at the output of the S-box. This will be correct, up to composing the
output of the S-box with some invertible linear mapping, and composing the input of the last linear
layer with the inverse mapping; which has no bearing on the encryption output.
Thus, peeling off Az amounts to finding the image space of each S-box through Az. For this purpose,
we will look for linear masks a, b ∈ {0, 1}n over the output of the cipher, such that the two dot products
〈F |a〉 and 〈F |b〉 of the encryption function F along each mask, are each equal to one bit at the output
of the same S-box in the last nonlinear layer Sy. Let us denote the set of such pairs (a, b) by S (as in
“solution”).
In order to compute S, the core property at play is that if masks a and b are as required, then the
binary product 〈F |a〉〈F |b〉 has degree only (m− 1)2 over the input variables of the cipher, whereas it
has degree 2(m− 1)2 in general. This means that 〈F |a〉〈F |b〉 sums to zero over any cube of dimension
(m− 1)2 + 1.
We now define the two linear masks a and b we are looking for as two vectors of binary unknowns.
Then f(a, b) = 〈F |a〉〈F |b〉 may be expressed as a quadratic polynomial over these unknowns, whose co-
efficients are 〈F |ei〉〈F |ej〉 for (ei) the canonical basis of Fn2 . Now, the fact that f(a, b) sums to zero over
some cube C gives us a quadratic condition on (a, b), whose coefficients are
∑
c∈C〈F (c)|ei〉〈F (c)|ej〉.
By computing n(n − 1)/2 cubes of dimension (m − 1)2 + 1, we thus derive n(n − 1)/2 quadratic
conditions on (a, b). The resulting system can then be solved by relinearization. This yields the linear
space K spanned by S.
However we want to recover S rather than its linear combinations K. Thus in a second step, we
compute S as S = K ∩ P , where P is essentially the set of elements that stem from a single product
of two masks a and b. While P is not a linear space, by guessing a few bits of the masks a, b, we can
get many linear constraints on the elements of P satisfying these guesses, and intersect these linear
constraints with K.
The first step may be regarded as the core of the attack; and it is also its bottleneck: essentially
we need to encrypt plaintexts spanning n(n− 1)/2 cubes of dimension (m− 1)2 + 1. We recall that in
the actual black-box scheme of [BBK14], we have S-boxes over m = 8 bits, and the total block size is
n = 128 bits, covered by k = 16 S-boxes, so the complexity is dominated by the computation of the
encryption function over 213 cubes of dimension 50, i.e. 263 encryptions.
4.2 Description of the attack
We use the notation of Section 3.1: let F = Az ◦ Sy ◦Ay ◦ Sx ◦Ax denote the encryption function. We
are interested in linear masks a ∈ {0, 1}n such that 〈F |a〉 depends only on the output of one S-box.
Since 〈F |a〉 = 〈Sy ◦ Ay ◦ Sx ◦ Ax|(Az)Ta〉, this is equivalent to saying that the active bits of (Az)Ta
span a single S-box.
In fact we are searching for the set S of pairs of masks (a, b) such that (Az)Ta and (Az)Tb span
the same single S-box. Formally, Ot = span{ei : mt ≤ i < m(t+ 1)} be the span of the output of the
t-th S-box, then:
S = {(a, b) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n : ∃t, (Az)Ta ∈ Ot and (Az)Tb ∈ Ot}
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The core property exploited in the attack is that if (a, b) belongs to S, then 〈F |a〉〈F |b〉 has degree
at most (m− 1)2, as shown by Lemma 2 below. On the other hand, if (a, b) 6∈ S, then 〈F |a〉〈F |b〉 will
look like the product of two independent random polynomials of degree (m − 1)2, and reach degree
2(m− 1)2 with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 2. Let G be an invertible mapping {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n with n > 2. For any two n-bit linear
masks a and b, H = 〈G|a〉〈G|b〉 has degree at most n− 1.
Proof. It is clear that the degree cannot exceed n, since we depend on only n variables (and we live in
F2). What we show is that it is less than n−1, as long as n > 2. If a = 0 or b = 0 or a = b, this is clear,
so we can assume that a, b are linearly independent. Note that there is only one possible monomial
of degree m, and its coefficient is equal to
∑
x∈{0,1}n H(x). So all we have to show is that this sum is
zero.
Because G is invertible, G(x) spans each value in {0, 1}n once as x spans {0, 1}n. As a consequence,
the pair (〈G|a〉, 〈G|b〉) takes each of its 4 possible values an equal number of times. In particular, it
takes the value (1, 1) exactly 1/4 of the time. Hence 〈G|a〉〈G|b〉 takes the value 1 exactly 2n−2 times,
which is even for n > 2. Thus
∑
x∈{0,1}n H(x) = 0 and we are done.
In the remainder, we regard two masks a and b as two sequences of n binary unknowns (a0, . . . , an−1)
and (b0, . . . , bn−1).
Step 1: kernel computation. If a, b are as desired, 〈F |a〉〈F |b〉 has degree at most (m− 1)2. Hence
the sum of this product over a cube of dimension (m − 1)2 + 1 is zero, as this amounts to an order-
(m− 1)2 + 1 differential of a degree (m− 1)2 function. Let then C denote a random cube of dimension
(m− 1)2 + 1 – that is, a random affine space of dimension (m− 1)2+1, over {0, 1}n. We have:∑
c∈C
〈F (c)|a〉〈F (c)|b〉 =
∑
c∈C
∑
i<n
aiFi(c)
∑
j<n
bjFj(c)
=
∑
i,j<n
(∑
c∈C
Fi(c)Fj(c)
)
aibj
=
∑
i<j<n
(∑
c∈C
Fi(c)Fj(c)
)
(aibj + ajbi)
To deduce the last line, notice that
∑
c∈C FiFi = 0 since F has degree less than dimC. Since the
equation above really only says something about aibj + ajbi rather than aibj (which is unavoidable,
since the roles of a and b are symmetric), we define E = Fn(n−1)/22 , see its canonical basis as ei,j for
i < j < n, and define λ(a, b) ∈ E by: λ(a, b)i,j = aibj + ajbi. By convention we set λj,i = λi,j and
λi,i = 0. The previous equations tells us that knowing only the n(n− 1)/2 bits
∑
c∈C Fi(c)Fj(c) yields
a quadratic condition on (a, b), and more specifically a linear condition on λ(a, b). Whence we proceed
with Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1: GenerateCondition
Input: A random cube C of dimension (m− 1)2 + 1 over {0, 1}n
1 Let sum = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ E
2 for c ∈ C do
3 (x0, . . . , xn−1)← F (c)
4 t← (xixj for i < j < n) ∈ E
5 sum = sum+ t
6 return sum
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Let M be a binary matrix of size (n2/2)× (n(n− 1)/2), whose rows are separate outputs of Alg. 1.
Let K be the kernel of this matrix. Then for all (a, b) ∈ S, λ(a, b) is necessarily in K. Thus K contains
the span of the λ(a, b)’s for (a, b) ∈ S. Because M contains more than n(n− 1)/2, with overwhelming
probability K contains no other vector6. This is confirmed by our experiments.
Complexity analysis. Overall, the dominant cost is to compute 2(m−1)2+1 encryptions per cube,
for n2/2 cubes, which amounts to a total of n22(m−1)2 encryptions. With the parameters of [BBK14],
this is 263 encryptions. In practice, we could limit ourselves to dimension-(m− 1)2 + 1 subcubes of a
single dimension-(m− 1)2 + 2 cube, which would cost only 2(m−1)2+2 encryptions. However we would
still need to sum (pairwise bit products of) ciphertexts for each subcube, so while this approach would
certainly be an improvement in practice, we believe it is cleaner to simply state the complexity as
n22(m−1)2 encryption equivalents.
Beside that, we also need to compute the kernel of a matrix of dimension n(n− 1)/2, which incurs
a cost of roughly n6/8 basic linear operations. With the parameters of [BBK14], we need to invert a
binary matrix of dimension 213, costing around 239 (in practice, highly optimized) operations, so this
is negligible compared to the required number of encryptions.
Step 2: extracting masks. Let:
P = {λ ∈ E : ∃a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, λ = λ(a, b)}
Clearly we have λ(S) ⊆ K∩P . In fact, we assume λ(S) = K∩P , which is confirmed by our experiments.
We now want to computeK∩P , but we do not need to enumerate the whole intersectionK∩P directly:
for our purpose, it suffices to recover enough elements of λ(S) such that the corresponding masks span
the output space of all S-boxes. Indeed, recall that our end goal is merely to find the image of all k
S-boxes through the last linear layer. Thus, in the remainder, we explain how to find a random element
in K ∩ P . Once we have found km linearly independent masks in this manner, we will be done.
The general idea to find a random element of K ∩ P is as follows. We begin by guessing the value
of a few pairs (ai, bi). This yields linear constraints on the λi,j ’s. As an example, if (a0, b0) = (0, 0),
then ∀i, λ0,i = 0. Because the constraints are linear and so is the space K, finding the elements of K
satisfying the constraints only involves basic linear algebra. Thus, all we have to do is guess enough
constraints to single out an element of S with constant probability, and recover that element as the
one-dimensional subspace of K satisfying the constraints.
More precisely, assume we guess 2r bits of a, b as:
a0, . . . , ar−1 = α0, . . . , αr−1
b0, . . . , br−1 = β0, . . . , βr−1
We view pairs (αi, βi) as elements of F22. Assume there exists some linear dependency between the
(αi, βi)’s: that is, for some (µi) ∈ {0, 1}r:
r−1∑
i=0
µi(αi, βi) = (0, 0)
Then for all j < n, we have:
r−1∑
i=0
µiλi,j = bj
r−1∑
i=0
µiai + aj
r−1∑
i=0
µibi = 0 (1)
6 This point is the only reason we pick n2/2 rows rather than only n(n − 1)/2; but we may as easily choose
n(n − 1)/2 plus some small constant. In practice it we can just pick n(n − 1)/2 rows, and add more as
required until the kernel has the expected dimension km(m− 1)/2.
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Now, since F22 has dimension only 2, we can be sure that there exist r− 2 independent linear relations
between the (αi, βi)’s, from which we deduce as above (r − 2)n linear relations on the λi,j ’s. In
Appendix A.1, we prove that at least (r − 2)(n− r) of these relations are linearly independent.
Now, the cardinality of S is k(2m − 1)(2m − 2) ≈ k22m. Hence if we choose r = blog(|S|)/2c ≈
m+ 12 log k, and randomly guess the values of (ai, bi) for i < r, then we can expect that with constant
probability there exists exactly one element in S satisfying our guess. More precisely, each element
has a probability (close to) 2−2b|S|/2c ≈ 2−|S| of fitting our guess of 2r bits, so this probability is close
to |S|
(
|S|−1(1 − |S|−1)|S|−1
)
≈ 1/e. Thus, if we denote by T the subspace of E of vectors satisfying
the linear constraints induced by our guess, with probability roughly 1/3, λ(S) ∩ T contains a single
element.
On the other hand, K is generated by pairs of masks corresponding to distinct bits for each S-box
in Sy. Hence dimK = km(m− 1)/2 = n(m− 1)/2. As shown earlier, from our 2r guesses, we deduce
(at least) (r − 2)(n− r) linear conditions on the (λi,j)’s, so codim T ≥ (r − 2)(n− r). Since we chose
r = m+ 12 log k, this means:
codim T ≥ (m− 2 + 12 log k) · (n−m−
1
2 log k)
dimK = (m− 1) · (n/2)
Thus, having 12 log k ≥ 1, i.e. k ≥ 4, and m +
1
2 log k ≥ n/2, which is easily the case with concrete
parameters m = 8, k = 16, n = 128, we have codim T ≥ dimK, and so K ∩ T is not expected to
contain any extra vector beside the span of λ(S) ∩ T . This is confirmed by our experiments.
In summary, if we pick r = m + 12 log k and randomly guess the first r pairs of bits (ai, bi), then
with probability close to 1/e, K ∩ T contains only a single vector, which belongs to λ(S) ∩ T and in
particular to λ(S). In practice it may be worthwhile to guess a little less than m + 12 log k pairs to
ensure K ∩ T is nonzero, then guess more as needed to single out a solution. Once we have a single
element in λ(S), it is easy to recover the two masks (a, b) it stems from7.
In the end, we recover two masks (a, b) coming from the same S-box. If we repeat this process
n = km times on average, the masks we recover will span the output of each S-box (indeed we recover
2 masks each time, so n tries is more than enough with high probability). Furthermore, checking
whether two masks belong to the same S-box is very cheap (for two masks a, b, we only need to check
whether λ(a, b) is in K), so we recover the output space of each S-box.
Complexity analysis. In order to get a random element in S, each guess of 2r bits yields roughly
1/3 chance of recovering an element by intersecting linear spaces K and T . Since K has dimension
n(m − 1)/2, the complexity is roughly (n(m − 1)/2)3 per try, and we need 3 tries on average for one
success. Then the process must be repeated n times. Thus the complexity may be evaluated to roughly
3
8n
4(m − 1)3 basic linear operations. With the parameters of [BBK14], this amounts to 236 linear
operations, so this step is negligible compared to Step 1 (and quite practical besides).
Before closing this section, we note that our attack does not really depend on the randomness of
the S-boxes or affine layers. All that is required of the S-boxes is that the degree of zizj vary depending
on whether i and j belong to the same S-box. This makes the attack quite general, in the same sense
as the structural attack of [BS01].
5 Attacks on the χ-based public-key scheme
In this section, our goal is to recover the private key of the χ-based ASASA scheme, using only the
public key. For this purpose, we peel off one layer at a time, starting with the last affine layer Az.
We actually propose two different ways to achieve this. The first attack is our main algebraic attack
from Section 4, with some adjustments to account for the specificities of χ and the presence of the
7 It can be shown that λ is invertible except on its zero output, which is reached only when a = 0, b = 0 or
a = b. An inversion algorithm is given in Appendix A.2.
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perturbation. It is presented in Section 5.1. The second attack reduces the problem to an instance of
LPN, and is presented in Section 5.2. Once the last affine layer has been removed with either attack,
we move on to attacking the remaining layers one at a time in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
5.1 Algebraic attack on the χ scheme
The χ scheme can be attacked in exactly the same manner as the black-box scheme in Section 4. Using
the notations of Sections 3.1 and 3.4, we have:
zizi+1 = (y′i + y′i+1y
′
i+2) · (y′i+1 + y′i+2y
′
i+3)
= y′iy′i+1 + y′iy′i+2y
′
i+3
Here the crucial point is that y′i+2 is shared by the only degree-4 term of both sides. Thus the degree of
zizi+1 is bounded by 6. Likewise, the degree of zi+1(zi+zi+2) = zizi+1 +zi+1zi+2 is also bounded by 6,
as the sum of two products of the previous form. On the other hand, any product of linear combinations
(
∑
αizi)(
∑
βizi) not of the previous two forms does not share common y′i’s in its higher-degree terms,
so no simplification occurs, and the product reaches degree 8 with overwhelming probability.
As a result, we can proceed as in Section 4. Let n = 127 be the size of the scheme, p = 24 the
number of perturbation polynomials. The positions of the p perturbation polynomials are not defined
in the original paper; in the sequel we assume that they are next to each other. Other choices of
positions increase the tedium of the attack rather than its difficulty. A brief discussion of random
positions for perturbation polynomials is offered in Appendix B. Due to the rotational symmetry of χ,
the positions of the perturbed bits is only defined modulo rotational symmetry; for convenience, we
assume that perturbed bits are at positions zn−p to zn−1.
The full attack presented below has been verified experimentally for small values of n.
Step 1: kernel computation. We fill the rows of an n(n− 1)/2× n(n− 1)/2 matrix with separate
outputs of Algorithm 1, with the difference that the dimension of cubes in the algorithm is only 7
(instead of (m − 1)2 + 1 = 50 in the black-box case). Then we compute the kernel K of this matrix.
Since n(n− 1)/2 ≈ 213 the complexity of this step is roughly 239 basic linear operations.
Step 2: extracting masks. The second step is to intersect K with the set P of elements of the form
λ(a, b) to recover actual solutions (see Section 4, step 2). In Section 4 we were content with finding
random elements of K ∩P . Now we want to find all of them. To do so, instead of guessing a few pairs
(ai, bi) as earlier, we exhaust all possibilities for (a0, b0) then (a1, b1) and so forth along a tree-based
search. For each branch, we stop when the dimension of K intersected with the linear constraints
stemming from our guesses of (ai, bi)’s is reduced to 1. Each branch yields a solution λ(a, b), from
which the two masks a and b can be easily recovered.
Step 3: sorting masks. Let ai = ((Lz)T)−1ei be the linear mask such that zi = 〈F |ai〉 (for the
sake of clarity we first assume Cz = 0; this has no impact on the attack until step 4 in Section 5.3
where we will recover Cz). At this point we have recovered the set S of all (unordered) pairs of masks
{ai, ai+1} and {ai, ai−1 + ai+1} for i < n− p, i.e. such that the corresponding zi’s are not perturbed.
Now we want to distinguish masks ai−1 +ai+1 from masks ai. For each i such that zi−1, zi, zi+1 are not
perturbed, this is easy enough, as ai appears exactly three times among unordered pairs in S: namely
in the pairs {ai, ai−1}, {ai, ai+2} and {ai, ai−1 + ai+1}; whereas masks of the form ai−1 + ai+1 appear
only once, in {ai−1 + ai+1, ai}.
Thus we have recovered every ai for which zi−1, zi, zi+1 are not perturbed. Since perturbed bits
are next to each other, we have recovered all unperturbed ai’s save the two ai’s on the outer edge of
the perturbation, i.e. a0 and an−p−1. We can also order all recovered ai’s simply by checking whether
{ai, ai+1} is in S. In other words, we look at S as the set of edges of a graph whose vertices are
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the elements of pairs in S; then the chain (a1, . . . , an−p−2) is simply the longest path in this graph.
In fact we recover (a1, . . . , an−p−2), minus its direction: that is, so far, we cannot distinguish it from
(an−p−2, . . . , a1). If we look at the neighbors of the end points of the path, we also recover {a0, a0 +a2}
and {an−p−1, an−p−3 + an−p−1}. However we are not equipped to tell apart the members of each pair
with only S at our disposal.
To find a0 in {a0, a0 + a2} (and likewise an−p−2 in {an−p−1, an−p−3 + an−p−1}), a very efficient
technique is to anticipate a little and use the distinguisher from Section 5.2. Namely, in short, we
differentiate the encryption function F twice using two fixed random input differences δ1 6= δ2, and
check whether for a fraction 1/4 of possible choices of (δ1, δ2), 〈∂2F/∂δ1∂δ2|x〉 is equal to a constant
with bias 2−4: this property holds if and only if x is one of the ai’s. This only requires around
216 encryptions for each choice of (δ1, δ2), and thus completes in negligible time. Another more self-
contained approach is to move on to the next step (in Section 5.3), where the algorithm we use is
executed separately on each recovered mask ai, and fails for a0 + a2 but not a1. However this would
be slower in practice.
Regardless of which solution was chosen, we now assume that we know the whole ordered chain
(a0, . . . , an−p−1) of masks corresponding to unperturbed bits. At this stage we are only missing the
direction of the chain, i.e. we cannot distinguish (a0, . . . , an−p−1) from (an−p−1, . . . , a0). This will be
corrected at the next step.
As mentioned earlier, we propose two different techniques to recover the first linear layer of the χ
scheme: one algebraic technique, and another based on LPN. We have now just completed the algebraic
technique. In the next section we present the LPN-based technique. Afterwards we will move on to the
remaining steps, which are common to both techniques, and fully break the cipher with the knowledge
of (a0, . . . , an−p−1), in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
5.2 LPN-based attack on the χ scheme
We now present a different approach to remove the last linear layer of the χ scheme. This approach relies
on the fact that each output bit of χ is almost linear, in the sense that the only nonlinear component
is the product of two input bits. In particular this nonlinear component is zero with probability 3/4.
The idea is then to treat this nonlinear component as random noise. To achieve this we differentiate
the encryption function F twice. So the first ASA layers of F ′′ yield a constant; then ASAS is a noisy
constant due to the weak nonlinearity; and ASASA is a noisy constant accessed through Az. This
allows us to reduce the problem of recovering Az to (a close variant of) an LPN instance with tractable
parameters.
We now describe the attack in detail. First, pick two distinct random differences δ1, δ2 ∈ {0, 1}n.
Then compute the order 2 differential of the encryption function along these two differences. That is,
let F ′′ = ∂F/∂δ1∂δ2. This second-order differential is constant at the output of F y
′ = Ay ◦ χ ◦ Ax,
since χ has degree only two:
(F y
′
)′′(x) 4= ∂F y
′
/∂δ1∂δ2 = C(δ1, δ2)
Now if we look at a single bit at the output of F z = χ ◦ F y′ , we have:
(F z)′′i (x) = (F y
′
)′′i (x) + F
y′
i+1F
y′
i+2(x) + F
y′
i+1F
y′
i+2(x+ δ1)
+ F y′i+1F
y′
i+2(x+ δ2) + F
y′
i+1F
y′
i+2(x+ δ1 + δ2) (2)
That is, a bit at the output of (F z)′′ still sums up to a constant, plus the sum of four bit products. If
we look at each product as an independent random binary variable that is zero with probability 3/4,
i.e. bias 2−1, then by the Piling-up Lemma (Lemma 1) the sum is equal to zero with bias 2−4.
Experiments show that modeling the four products as independent is not quite accurate: a signifi-
cant discrepancy is introduced by the fact that the four inputs of the products sum up to a constant. For
the sake of clarity, we will disregard this for now and pretend that the four products are independent.
We will come back to this issue later on.
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Now a single linear layer remains between (F z)′′ and F ′′. Let si ∈ {0, 1}n be the linear mask such
that 〈F |si〉 = F zi (once again we assume Cz = 0, and postpone taking Cz into account until step 4
of the attack). Then 〈F ′′|si〉 is equal to a constant with bias 2−4. Now let us compute N different
outputs of F ′′ for some N to be determined later, which costs 4N calls to the encryption function F .
Let us stack these N outputs in an N × n matrix A.
Then we know that A · si is either the all-zero or the all-one vector (depending on (F y
′)′′i ) plus
a noise of bias 2−4. Thus finding si is essentially an LPN problem with dimension n = 127 and bias
2−4 (i.e. noise 1/2 + 2−5). Of course this is not quite an LPN instance: A is not uniform, there are n
solutions instead of one, and there is no output vector b (although we could isolate the last column of
A and define it as the output vector). However in practice none of this should hinder the performance
of a BKW algorithm [BKW03]. Thus we make the heuristic assumption that BKW performs here as it
would on a standard LPN instance8.
In the end, we recover the masks si such that zi = 〈F |si〉. Before moving on to the next stage of
the attack, we go back to the earlier independence assumption.
Dependency between the four products. In the reasoning above, we have modeled the four bit
products in Equation 2 as independent binary random variables with bias 2−1. That is, we assumed
the four products would behave as:
Π = W1W2 +X1X2 + Y1Y2 + Z1Z2
where Wi, Xi, Yi, Zi are uniformly random independent binary variables. This yields an expectancy
E[Π] with bias 2−4. As noted above, this is not quite accurate, and we now provide a more precise
model that matches with our experiments.
Since F y′ has degree two, (F y′)′′ is a constant, dependent only on δ1 and δ2. This implies that in
the previous formula, we have W1 +X1 + Y1 + Z1 = (F y
′)′′i+1 and W2 +X2 + Y2 + Z2 = (F y
′)′′i+2. To
capture this, we look at:
E(c1, c2) = E[Π |W1 +X1 + Y1 + Z1 = c1,W2 +X2 + Y2 + Z2 = c2]
It turns out that E(0, 0) has a stronger bias, close to 2−3; while perhaps surprisingly, E(a, b) for
(a, b) 6= (0, 0) has bias zero, and is thus not suitable for our attack. Since G′′ is essentially random,
this means that our technique will work for only a fraction 1/4 of output bits. However, once we have
recovered these output bits, we can easily change δ1, δ2 to obtain a new value of G′′ and start over to
find new output bits.
After k iterations of the above process, a given bit at position i ≤ 127 will have probability (3/4)k
of remaining undiscovered. In order for all 103 unperturbed bits to be discovered with good probability,
it is thus enough to perform k = − log(103)/ log(3/4) ≈ 16 iterations.
In the end we recover all linear masks ai corresponding to unperturbed bits at the output of the
second χ layer; i.e. ai = ((Az)T)−1ei for 0 ≤ i < n − p. The ai’s can then be ordered into a chain
(a0, . . . , an−p−1) like in Section 5.1: neighbouring ai’s are characterized by the fact that 〈F |ai〉〈F |ai+1〉
has degree 6. We postpone distinguishing between (a0, . . . , an−p−1) and (an−p−1, . . . , a0) until Sec-
tion 5.3.
Complexity analysis. According to Theorem 2 in [LF06], the number of samples needed to solve
an LPN instance of dimension 127 and bias 2−4 is N = 244 (attained by setting a = 3 and b = 43).
This requires 4N = 246 encryptions. Moreover the dominant cost in the time complexity is to sort the
8 To the best of our knowledge, we have yet to see an LPN-like problem with a matrix A on which BKW
underperforms significantly compared to the uniform case, unless the problem was specifically crafted for
this purpose. The existence of multiple solutions is also a notable difference in our case. However in a classic
application of BKW with a fast Fourier transform at the end, this only means that the Fourier transform
will output several solutions. Note that the dimension of the Fourier transform will be close to 127/3 ≈ 42
[LF06], and we have only ≈ 214 solutions, so they are distinct on their last 42 bits with very high probability.
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244 samples a times, which requires roughly 3 · 44 · 244 < 252 basic operations. Finally, as noted above,
we need to iterate the process 16 times to recover all unperturbed output bits with good probability,
so our overall time complexity is increased to 256 for BKW, and 250 encryptions to gather samples
(slightly less with a structure sharing some plaintexts between the 16 iterations).
5.3 From ASAS to ASA
The next layer we wish to peel off is a χ layer, which is entirely public. It may seem that applying
χ−1 should be enough. The difficulty arises from the fact that we do not know the full output of χ,
but only n− p bits. Furthermore, if our goal was merely to decrypt some specific ciphertext, we could
use other techniques, e.g. the fact that guessing one bit at the input of χ produces a cascade effect
that allows recovery of all other input bits from output bits, regardless of the fact that the function
has been truncated [Dae95]. However our goal is different: we want to recover the secret key, not just
be able to decrypt messages. For this purpose we want to cleanly recover the input of χ in the form of
degree 2 polynomials, for every unperturbed bit. We propose a technique to achieve this below.
From the previous step, we are in possession of (a0, . . . , an−p−1) as defined above. Since by definition
zi = 〈F |ai〉, this means we know zi for 0 ≤ i < n − p. Note that y′i has degree only 2, and we know
that zi = y′i + y′i+1y′i+2. In order to reverse the χ layer, we set out to recover y′i, y′i+1, y′i+2 from the
knowledge of only zi, by using the fact that y′i, y′i+1, y′i+2 are quadratic.
This reduces to the following problem: given P = A+B ·C, where A,B,C are degree-2 polynomials,
recover A,B,C. A closer look reveals that this problem is not possible exactly as stated, because P can
be equivalently written in several different ways, such as: A+B ·C, A+B+B ·C, or A+C+(B+C)·C.
On the other hand, we assume that for uniformly random A,B,C, the probability that P may be
written in some unrelated way, i.e. P = C + D · E for C,D,E not in the linear span of A,B,C, 1, is
overwhelmingly low. This situation has never occurred in our experiments. Thus our problem reduces
to:
Problem 1. Let A,B,C be quadratic polynomials in Q = F2[X0, . . . , Xn−1]/〈X2i − Xi〉. Let P =
A+B · C. The problem is to recover quadratic A′, B′, C ′ such that P = A′ +B′ · C ′, given only P .
Remark 1. Problem 1 is part of a general family of polynomial decomposition problems which have
very recently been shown to be solvable in polynomial time [BHT15]. However our particular instance
is much easier than the general case considered in [Bha14, BHT15]. This allows us to propose a much
simpler and more efficient dedicated algorithm. Our algorithm is unrelated to those used in the general
case, which rely on higher-order Fourier analysis.
Our previous assumption says A′ ∈ span{A,B,C, 1}; B′, C ′ ∈ span{B,C, 1}. A straightforward
approach to tackle the problem is to write B formally as a generic degree-2 polynomial with unknown
coefficients This gives us k = 1 +n+n(n+ 1)/2 ≈ n2/2 binary unknowns. Then we observe that B ·P
has degree only 4 (since B2 = B). Each term of degree 5 in B · P must have a zero coefficient, and
thus each term gives us a linear constraint on the unknown coefficients of B. Collecting the constraints
takes up negligible time, at which point we have a k × k matrix whose kernel is span{B,C, 1}. This
gives us a few possibilities for B′, C ′, which we can filter by checking that A′ = P −B′ ·C ′ has degree
2. The complexity of this approach boils down to inverting a k-dimensional binary matrix, which costs
essentially 23k basic linear operations. In our case this amounts to 239 basic linear operations. While
this is a straightforward approach, and its complexity is reasonable, a much more efficient algorithm
is given below.
An Efficient Algorithm for Problem 1. As previously mentioned, A′ = A,B′ = B,C ′ = C cannot
be the only solution; for instance A′ = A + C,B′ = B + C,C ′ = C is also possible. Conceptually,
our algorithm will attempt to recover B and C; but in effect it recovers any two linearly independent
elements of span{B,C, 1}, which are indistinguishable from (B,C) with knowledge of only P .
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In fact our algorithm only attempts to recover the homogeneous degree-2 components of B,C. The
linear components can then be defined as 2n unknowns and recovered using simple linear algebra from
the degree-3 monomials of P . This only involves inverting a matrix in dimension 2n = 254, which has
negligible cost. Moreover A = P −B ·C. Thus we focus on recovering the degree-2 monomials of B,C.
In the remainder we will slightly abuse notation and write B,C to mean the homogeneous degree-2
components of B,C, i.e. we disregard the linear and constant components.
In an effort to reduce notational clutter, we always assume knowledge of P , and do not pass it
as parameter to every algorithm. Let n = 127 and [n] = {0, . . . , n − 1}. For D ∈ Q, we write Di,j
for the coefficient of XiXj in D (we identify elements of Q with their square-free representation in
F2[X0, . . . , Xn−1]). By convention Di,i = 0. Likewise we define Pi,j,k,l as the coefficient of XiXjXkXl
in P . Finally, for D ∈ Q, Di,∗ is the vector (Di,0, . . . , Di,n−1) ∈ Fn2 .
Our algorithm makes use of two simple “zero oracles” Z (Alg. 3) and Z ′ (Alg. 2). The oracle Z(i, j)
returns True if and only if Bi,j = Ci,j = 0. It makes use of the oracle Z ′, which returns True if and
only if:
Bi,j = Bj,k = Bi,k = Ci,j = Cj,k = Ci,k = 0 (3)
Both oracles attempt to find information on Bi,j and Ci,j , and in their description above, we describe
their output as depending on B and C. But the oracle answers are actually computed without access to
either, as we shall see. In both cases there is a small chance of the oracle answer being wrong. However
this happens with low probability, and our algorithm is made resilient to such errors at a later point.
Algorithm 2: ZeroTripletOracle Z ′
Input: distinct i, j, k ∈ [n]
Output: True if Eq. 3 holds, False otherwise
1 for l 6= i, j, k ∈ [n] do
2 if Pi,j,k,l = 1 then
3 return False
4 return True
Note that we have:
Pi,j,k,l = Bi,jCk,l +Bi,kCj,l +Bi,lCj,k +Bj,kCi,l +Bj,lCi,k +Bk,lCi,j (4)
So Eq. 3 implies ∀l, Pi,j,k,l = 0. Conversely if Eq. 3 does not hold, then Pi,j,k,l = 0 holds for all l 6= i, j, k
with probability close to 2−(n−3) = 2−124. As a result, Z ′ is correct except with negligible probability.
Now we use Z ′ to build Z, which returns True if and only if Bi,j = Ci,j = 0. As with Z ′, there is
Algorithm 3: ZeroPairOracle Z
Input: distinct i, j ∈ [n]
Output: True if Bi,j = Ci,j = 0, False otherwise
1 for k 6= i, j ∈ [n] do
2 if Z(i, j, k) then
3 return True
4 return False
a low probability of incorrect answer for Z ′, but our algorithm will be made resilient to these errors
later on.
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Algorithm 4: FindGood
Input: i ∈ [n]
Output: j, k ∈ [n] such that Bi,j = Bi,k = Ci,j = Ci,k = 0, but (Bj,k, Cj,k) 6= (0, 0)
1 while True do
2 j ←$ [n]− {i}
3 k ←$ [n]− {i, j}
4 if Z(i, j) and Z(i, k) and not Z(j, k) then
5 return (j, k)
Now we build a function FindGood(i) (Alg. 4), whose purpose will become clear shortly. FindGood
picks j, k randomly until Z(i, j) and Z(i, k) hold, but not Z(j, k). This is the case with probability
roughly 2−6, and there are n(n − 1)/2 choices for j, k so the probability of failure is negligible. Now
we explain the point of FindGood.
Let (λ, µ) = (Bj,k, Cj,k). The point of having the conditions at the output of FindGood is that
due to Eq.4, they imply:
∀l, Pi,j,k,l = λBi,l + µCi,l
so we recover (λB+µC)i,l for all l simply by looking at Pi,j,k,l. For simplicity we assume (λ, µ) = (1, 0),
and so we are recovering Bi,l (other cases correspond to the other two nonzero elements of span{B,C},
which as pointed earlier cannot be distinguished from B). If we view B as an n× n symmetric binary
matrix with entries Bi,j , this means we recover a row of B, namely Bi,∗. Now we can naturally define
GetSpace(i) (Alg. 5), which recovers span{Bi,∗, Ci,∗}:
Algorithm 5: GetSpace
Input: i ∈ [n]
Output: span{Bi,∗, Ci,∗}
1 Let v ∈ Fn2
2 Let E = {0} ⊆ Fn2
3 while dimE < 2 do
4 (j, k)← FindGood(i)
5 for l ∈ [n] do
6 vl ← Pi,j,k,l
7 E ← E + span{v}
8 return E
For all i we now know span{Bi,∗, Ci,∗}. All that remains to do in order to build B (or C, or B+C)
is to choose a nonzero element of GetSpace(i) as the first row; then an element of GetSpace(1) as
the second row; and so forth. At each step i, we make sure that our choice of elements is coherent up
to this point by checking that the submatrix of rows 0 to i and columns 0 to i is symmetric. If not, we
change our choice of element, backtracking if necessary. This is described in Alg. 6.
In the end, span{B,C} is recovered as Solve(0, 0, 0) (where the first two parameters are the zero
matrix of Fn×n2 ). Notice that every recursive call to Solve repeats its inner loop twice in case of
failure. This is to account for the very rare case where the output of GetSpace might be wrong. Our
implementation never returns FAIL and completes within a second for n = 127, which is the actual n
value for the χ-based ASASA scheme (see Section 1.4 for a link to our implementation).
Application to ASAS. Note that we only need to go through the previous algorithm for the first
unperturbed bit in the chain (z0, . . . , zn−p−1), namely z0. Indeed, we then recover y′0, y′1, y′2, and for
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Algorithm 6: Solve
Input: G,H ∈ Fn×n2 , step ∈ [n]
Output: span{B,C} or FAIL
1 if step = n then
2 return span{G,H}
3 for try ∈ {1, 2} do
4 for each choice of (x, y) linearly independent in GetSpace(step) do
5 Gstep,∗ ← x
6 Hstep,∗ ← y
7 if ∀i < step, Gi,step = Gstep,i and Hi,step = Hstep,i then
8 S ← Solve(G,H, step + 1)
9 if S 6= FAIL then
10 return S
11 return FAIL
the next bit we have z1 = y′1 + y′2y′3, so only y′3 remains to be determined. This can be performed in
negligible time, as the system of equations stemming from this equality on the coefficients of y′3 is very
sparse9. By induction we can propagate this process to all other unperturbed bits.
However in the course of this process we also have to deal with the fact that even from the start,
we do not recover y′0, y′1, y′2 exactly, but span{y′0, y′1, y′2, 1} and span{y′1, y′2, 1}. Thus we need to guess
y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2 from the elements of these two vector spaces, then start the process of rebuilding the rest of
the chain (y′0, . . . , y′n−p−1) as in the previous paragraph. In our experiments, it turns out that as long
as p ≥ 2, there are always exactly 8 solutions for the chain of degree-2 polynomials (y′0, . . . , y′n−p−1).
To understand why, we need to look at the last unperturbed bit zn−p−1. For this bit, we recover
span{y′n−p−1, y′n−p, y′n−p+1, 1} and span{y′n−p, y′n−p+1, 1}. We can recognize y′n−p−1 in the first space
(or rather span{y′n−p−1, 1}) because it is also one of the factors in the expression of zn−p−2. We can
also identify span{y′n−p, 1} for the same reason. However there is fundamentally no way to tell y′n−p−1
apart from y′n−p−1, and likewise for y′n−p, y′n−p, because the necessary information is erased from the
public key by the perturbation. For y′n−p for instance, we could flip the (n−p)-th bit in the constant C1
of Ay and also flip the perturbed bit zn−p and this would flip y′n−p without changing (z0, . . . , zn−p−1).
Thus all 8 solutions for (y′0, . . . , y′n−p−1) are valid in the sense that they correspond to equivalent keys,
and we are free to choose one of them arbitrarily.
Finally, up to this stage of the attack, we have pretended that Cz = 0. This actually has no impact
on any algorithm so far, except the one just above. With nonzero Cz, we have 〈F |ai〉 = zi + ci for
c = (Az)−1Cz. This merely adds another degree of freedom in the construction of the previous chain:
we guess c0 and attempt to go through the process of building the chain. If our guess was incorrect the
algorithm fails after two iterations. Once it goes through for two iterations we guess c1 and attempt
one more iteration, and so forth. Since the chain-building step has negligible complexity, this takes up
negligible time.
Overall our algorithm is able to solve Problem 1 for the full n = 127 within a second on a laptop
computer. Thus the time complexity of this step is negligible.
5.4 Peeling off the remaining ASA layers
From ASA to SA. At the end of the previous step we have recovered the chain (y′0, . . . , y′n−p−1)
of polynomials at the output of Ay. Now we are left with the task of recovering Ax, bAycn−p from
9 For instance each degree-4 term in z1 may be written in only
(4
2
)
= 6 ways as a product of two quadratic
terms, and so the corresponding equation on the coefficients of y′3 involves only 3 terms on average, and
many such equations have only one term, yielding a direct equality.
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H = bAy ◦χ◦Axcn−p. Up to now we have always taken advantage of the very simple action of χ when
considering only a single output bit. However because Ay is truncated, we cannot expect that there
exist linear masks on the truncated output of Ay that give us access to a single bit at the output of χ.
For this reason we switch gear and set out to remove the first layer Ax instead.
First, we want to compute the linear component Lx of Ax. Let ∆ = {(Lx)−1ei : i < n} denote the
set of differences δ that activate only a single bit at the input of χ. Observe that a single bit difference
at the input of χ only affects 3 output bits. As a result we have an oracle O that recognizes elements
of ∆: namely for δ ∈ ∆, the output of H ′ = ∂H/∂δ has dimension only 3 as x spans {0, 1}n.
Furthermore, a closer look reveals that if we remove the constant component in the output of H ′,
then the output of H ′ has dimension only 2. The reason for this is that, while each bit at the input
of χ affects 3 bits at the output, only 2 bits are affected in a nonlinear manner; and since we are
differentiating H, the linear component of χ only affects the constant component in the output of H ′.
Let us define an input difference δ as a vector of n binary unknowns. Then we can formally compute
the function H ′. Assume δ ∈ ∆. Per the previous observation, we know that the linear component of
H ′(x) has dimension only two as x spans {0, 1}n. That is, for any pairwise distinct k0, k1, k2 < n− p,
there exists a nonzero vector (λ0, λ1, λ2) such that
∑
λiH
′
ki
= C(δ) is constant10.
Now observe that H ′ has degree only one in its input variables xi, and the coefficient of each xi is
a linear combination of δi’s, hence the above equality gives us n linear conditions on δ. Since δ lives in
a space of dimension n, we can hope that this is enough to recover δ, at the cost of guessing the λi’s
(only 8 possibilities).
In short the algorithm so far sums up to:
1. Pick pairwise distinct k0, k1, k2 < n− p arbitrarily.
2. Guess λ = (λ0, λ1, λ2).
3. Write the polynomial equality
∑
λiH
′
ki
= 0. By looking at the coefficient of each xi in this equality,
we have n linear conditions on δ.
Let K(k, λ) denote the linear subspace of vectors satisfying these conditions. Then we know that for
every δ ∈ ∆, and every choice of k, there exists λ such that δ ∈ K(k, λ).
Note that the cardinality of ∆ is 128 = 27, while λ only contains 3 bits of information. Hence, in
order to single out each element of ∆, we repeat the previous algorithm 3 times. This gives us 3 sets of
8 spaces K(k, λ). For every choice of K in each set, we compute the intersection of the spaces (83 = 29
possibilities). This yields 29 intersections. By construction we know that each element of ∆ is in one
of the intersections. So we recover ∆ by testing every element in every intersection against the oracle
O.
There are 29 intersections, so the only remaining question is whether some of the intersections have
dimension greater than 0 or 1 (which may considerably slow down the algorithm). Our experiments
show that this is in fact the case, but the resulting spaces still have very low dimension. This is due
to “false positives” caused by differences δ that activate 2 or 3 differences at the input of δ; but these
are quickly weeded out by testing against the oracles O.
We have now recovered the linear component of Ax. Thus we have access to bAy ◦ χ ◦ (⊕Cx)cn−p,
where ⊕Cx denotes the addition of the constant Cx. In order to recover Cx, we can use the fact that
χ(v) +χ(v+ ei) = ei (where ei is the canonical basis of Fn2 ) if and only if vi−1 = vi+1 = 0. So for each
i, we can flip the bits at position i− 1 and i+ 1 at the input of bAy ◦χ ◦ (⊕Cx)cn−p until the previous
equality holds. This allows us to recover Cx very quickly.
Overall the complexity of this step can be approximated by 29 intersections of 3 spaces of dimension
128, which costs around 29 ·2 · (27)3 = 231, so this step is negligible compared to step 1. In fact we have
implemented this step on the full version of the scheme, and it takes only about a minute to complete
on a laptop computer.
From SA to A. We know bAy ◦ χcn−p, and we want to recover bAycn−p. Observe that χ(0) = 0, so
bCycn−p = F (0). Moreover χ(ei) = ei so bLy(ei)cn−p = bAy ◦ χcn−p(ei) and we are done.
10 We always mean “constant” and “non-constant” with respect to the input x of H ′, and not the difference δ.
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6 A practical attack on white-box ASASA
In this section we show that the actual security of small-block ASASA ciphers is much lower than
was estimated by Biryukov et al.. We describe a procedure to recover the secret components of such
schemes, thus breaking their weak white-box security (Definition 2). Our algorithm relies rather heavily
on heuristics, and evaluating its efficiency requires actual implementation. We focused on the smallest
white-box instance, 16-bit ASASA16, whose claimed security level is 64 bits. Our algorithm was able
to recover its secret components under one minute on a laptop computer.
6.1 Attack overview
Our general black-box attack from Section 4 does not apply, because the block size is too small to
allow computing cubes of dimension 50. On the other hand, the small block size makes it possible to
compute the distribution of output differences for a single input difference in very reasonable time. In
fact, one can compute and store the entire difference distribution table (DDT) of a 16-bit cipher using
just a standard PC. For slightly bigger instances such as a 24-bit cipher, computing and storing the
entire DDT is still barely possible, even though it would require 3TB of space and 248 invocations of
the cipher; computing the distribution of only a few differences on the other hand remains manageable.
Remark 2. Our attack makes use of the full codebook of the ciphers, which in general may be seen
as a very strong requirement. This is however only natural in the case of attacking white-box imple-
mentations, as the user is actually required to be given the full codebook of the super S-boxes as part
of the implementation.
Similarly to the attack of the black box scheme, it is already enough to recover only one of the
external affine (or linear) layers in order to break the security of ASASA. Indeed, this allows to reduce
the cipher to either of ASAS or SASA, which can then be attacked in practical time [BS01]. Thus we
focus on removing the first linear layer. In accordance with the opening remarks of Section 4.1, this
amounts to finding the image space of each S-box through (Ax)−1.
The general idea of the attack is to create an oracle able to recognize whether an input difference δ
activates one or two S-boxes in the first S-box layer Sx. More accurately, we create a ranking function
F such that F(δ) is expected to be significantly higher if δ activates only one S-box rather than two.
We present two choices for F which are both heuristic but nonetheless quite efficient as shown by
experiments. Both begin by computing the entire output difference distribution D(δ) for the input
difference δ, i.e. the row corresponding to δ in the DDT. Then the value of F(δ) is computed from
D(δ).
Walsh transform. The idea behind this version of the attack is quite intuitive. If δ activates only
one S-box, then after the first SA layers, two inner states computed from any two plaintexts with input
difference δ are equal on the output of the inactive S-box. Hence after the first ASA layers, they are
equal along 28 − 1 non-zero linear masks. Since these masks only traverse a single S-box layer before
the output of the cipher, linear cryptanalysis [Mat94] tells us that we can expect some linear masks to
be biased at the output of the cipher. On the other hand if both S-boxes are active in the first round,
no such phenomenon occurs, and linear biases on the output differences are expected to be weaker.
In order to measure this difference, we propose to compute, for every output mask a, the value
f(a) = (
∑
x∈{0,1}16〈∂F∂δ(x)|a〉) − 215 (where the sum is computed in Z). That is, 2−15f(a) is the
bias of the output differences D(δ) along mask a. The function f can be computed efficiently, since it
is precisely the Walsh transform of the characteristic function of D(δ), and we can use a fast Fourier
transform algorithm. Then as a ranking function F we simply choose max(f), i.e. the highest bias
among all output masks11.
11 Alternatively a less clean but more efficient ranking function in practice is to compute the number of large
values of f , where a value is considered large if it is higher than 4σ, for σ the standard deviation in the case
where δ activates 2 S-boxes (which needs only be computed once for some fixed random ASASA instance
— in fact δ ≈ 250 for ASASA16).
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Number of collisions. It turns out that performing the Walsh transform is not truly necessary.
Indeed, the number of collisions in D(δ) is higher when δ activates only 1 S-box; where by number
of collisions we mean 215 minus the number of distinct values in D(δ). This may be understood as
a consequence of the fact that whenever δ activates a single S-box, only 27 output differences are
possible after the first ASA layers; and depending on the properties of the active (random) S-box, the
distribution between these differences may be quite uneven. Whereas if both S-boxes are active, 215
differences are possible and the distribution is expected to be less skewed. Thus we pick as ranking
function F the number of collisions in D(δ) in the previous sense.
Once we have chosen a ranking function F , we simply compute the ranking of every possible input
difference, sort the differences, and choose the highest 16 linearly independent differences according to
our ranking. Our hope is that these differences only activate a single S-box. In a second step, we will
group together differences that activate the same S-box.
6.2 Attack description
We now describe the attack in detail. We focus on the collision ranking function, which is slightly more
efficient in practice.
First step. We wish to recover the individual components of the ASASA16 cipher Az ◦Sy ◦Ay ◦Sx ◦Ax.
The first step of our attack consists in finding 16 linearly independent input differences to the cipher
such that only one of the two S-boxes of Sx is active. In other words, we want to find a family of
differences δi such that for all i, Ax(δi) is zero in its 8 most significant or 8 least significant bits. As Ax
is invertible, there are 2× (28− 1) non-trivial such differences, but we need an efficient way to test if a
given difference is one of them. This can be done by considering the distribution of its corresponding
output differences, and counting the number of collisions, as outlined in the previous section.
That is, we attempt to recover 16 suitable differences δi by computing the entire DDT of ASASA16,
sorting the input differences by their decreasing number of collisions, and selecting the first 16 linearly
independent entries. We describe this formally as Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7: Finding a basis of differences activating only one S-box of Sx at a time
Input: An instance of ASASA16
Output: A set D of 16 linearly independent differences activating only one S-box of Sx
1 for δ := 1 to 216 − 1 do
2 F [δ] := 215 - # range(∂ASASA16/∂δ)
3 L := sorted differences δ’s in decreasing order for F
4 D := ∅
5 i := 0
6 while #D < 16 do
7 if L[i] is linearly independent from D then
8 D := D ∪ L[i]
9 i := i+ 1
10 Return D
Complexity analysis (Alg. 7). Computing one iteration of Line 2 requires 216 calls to ASASA16,
each one corresponding to one memory access, and at most 216 words of temporary storage. The loop
of Line 1 therefore requires 232 calls in total and 217 words of memory, including R. The sorting of
Line 3 can be done in about 220 accesses to R and does not require additional memory. The loop of
Line 6 has negligible cost. The total time complexity is thus of the order of 232 memory accesses and
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the memory complexity of the order of 217 words (about 218 bytes in this case), which are respectively
quadratic and linear in the size of the domain of ASASA16
Second step. From the previous step, we know 16 input differences δi that each activate only one
S-box of Sx, and we can now use this knowledge to recover the first layer Ax. Similarly to the attack
of the black-box scheme of Section 4, it is not possible to uniquely determine Ax; but it is enough
to recover one of the equivalent mappings and later choose the affine equivalent representation of
the S-boxes accordingly. The consequence of this is that we only need to identify two groups of 8
linearly independent δi’s, respectively activating the first and the second S-box. Once this is done, we
may assume any value for the images of a group as long as they are linearly independent and indeed
activate only one S-box.
In order to achieve our goal, we can use the fact that sums of differences of a single group still
activate only one S-box, while if the differences come from two groups they obviously activate two. We
can use the same method as in the first step to determine whether a sum activates one or two S-boxes,
and thence we may hope to find the correct grouping by ensuring that every linear combination of a
group (or equivalently every combination of two differences of a group) only activates a single S-box.
We can conveniently describe the resulting problem with a weighted graph and solve it with a
simple greedy algorithm. We define the vertices of the graph as being the differences δi, and draw an
edge between every pair of two (thus making the graph complete); the weight of the edge (δi, δj) is
defined as the ranking F(δi + δj) of δi + δj . The two partitions of 8 differences are then initialized
arbitrarily, with their weight defined as the sum of the weight of edges between vertices belonging to
the same partition. Finally, the following process is iterated until a fixed point is reached: for any pair
of vertices in different partitions, the pair is swapped if and only if this would result in increasing the
weight of the partition. We describe this formally as Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8: Computing partitions of D activating the same S-box
Input: A set D of 16 linearly independent differences activating only one S-box of Sx
Output: A partition (S1, S2) of D such that the S-box activated by differences in S1 (resp. S2) is the
same for every difference
1 Define W(S) as
∑
i,j∈S,i 6=j W [i][j]
2 for i := 1 to 16 do
3 for j := 1 to 16 do
4 W [i][j] := F(D[i] + D[j])
5 S1 := {D[i], i := 0. . .7}
6 S2 := {D[i], i := 8. . .15}
7 while ∞ do
8 for δi ∈ S1 do
9 for δj ∈ S2 do
10 S′1 := ((S1 − {δi}) ∪ {δj})
11 S′2 := ((S2 − {δj}) ∪ {δi})
12 if W(S′1) +W(S′2) >W(S1) +W(S2) then
13 S1 := S′1
14 S2 := S′2
15 if Neither S1 nor S2 has been modified then
16 Return (S1, S2)
Complexity analysis (Alg. 8). Assuming that the computations of Line 4 have been cached when
running Algorithm 7, every individual step can be computed with negligible time and memory. We
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then only need to estimate how many times the loop of Line 7 is executed before exiting on Line 16.
First it is easy to see that the algorithm does indeed eventually terminate, asW(S1)+W(S2) increases
every time there is as swap of differences. Then, because there are at most
(16
8
)
= 12870 partitions to
consider, we know that the process stops within this number of iterations. In practice, it is unlikely for
two S-boxes to be swapped more than once, and the observed time complexity is actually very small.
6.3 Experimental results and discussion
We implemented the previous algorithm in C++. The implementation was able to recover the first
linear layer of 16-bit ASASA in a minute on average. This strongly invalidates the security level of 64
bits estimated by [BBK14].
Moreover we implemented a faster but more heuristic algorithm in the Sage formal computation
language [Tea]. This variant uses an oracle O that predicts whether a difference δ activates one or
two S-boxes, rather than a ranking function. The oracle simply calls the ranking function, and decides
that δ activates a single S-box if F(δ) is above a certain threshold. The threshold is determined by
comparing values of F for δ’s that activate one S-box, versus values obtained when δ activates both
S-boxes (this computation only occurs once, by picking a known but random instance and performing
the measure).
The algorithm then proceeds by picking random δ’s and using the oracle to check whether δ activates
a single S-box. Once 16 such linearly independent δ’s are found the first step is complete. The second
step is identical to the original algorithm. Each δ has probability 2−8 of activating a single S-box.
Hence the expected number of δ’s that will need to be tested is 16 · 28 = 224, which is lower than the
232 DDT row computations incurred by the original algorithm. However this algorithm requires the
existence of a clean threshold between the two cases for δ’s.
Sage is a high-level interpreted language, which makes it significantly slower than an equivalent
implementation in C++. Nonetheless due to its lower complexity, the previous algorithm was also able
to succeed in a minute on average, with either choice of the ranking function F .
All of the implementations are publicly available on the Internet with a link provided in Section 1.4.
Remark 3. An interesting observation is that both ranking functions distinguish δ’s that activate one
or two S-boxes much less efficiently if Ay is maximum distance separable (MDS). However the attack
still goes through, meaning that relying on such matrices is not a suitable countermeasure.
6.4 Adapting the algorithm to larger white-box instances
The algorithm from the previous section can be adapted to larger white-box instances in a straight-
forwards manner. However the required computational power is higher. Beside the 16-bit instance, we
have also successfully run the attack on the 20-bit instance.
7 Conclusion
We presented a new algebraic attack able to efficiently break both the χ-based public-key cryptosystem
and the secret-key scheme of [BBK14]. In addition we proposed another attack that heuristically
reduces the key-recovery problem on the χ scheme to an easy instance of LPN. In the case of the public-
key scheme, both attacks go through regardless of the amount of perturbation. For both schemes, the
attacks are quite structural (in the case of the black-box scheme, it is in fact structural in the sense of
[BS01]), and seem difficult to patch. Finally, although the general attack on the black-box scheme does
not carry over to the small-block instances used for white-box designs, we also showed a very efficient
dedicated attack on some of the small-block instances, casting a doubt on their general suitability for
that purpose.
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Lower bounding the number of linear relations in Section 4.2, step 2
The problem may be formalized as follows. We are given α, β ∈ Fr2. The set of µ ∈ Fr2 such that∑
µi(αi, βi) = (0, 0) is (isomorphic to) the annihilator A of span{α, β} in the dual space (Fr2)∗. Let
M = Fn×n2 denote the space of n×n binary matrices, with basis ei,j . Let D = span({e∗i,i}∪{e∗i,j+e∗j,i}).
The space D is isomorphic to the annihilator of E = Fn(n−1)/22 ; that is, the space of the λi,j ’s in
Section 4.2. Let B = span{
∑
µie
∗
i,j : µ ∈ A, j > r}.
The point of the previous definitions is that the linear relations on E obtained from Eq. 1 for j > r
are exactly the vectors of the space B ∩D.
First, we prove that dimB ≥ (r− 2)(n− r). Clearly the projection of B on Cj = span{e∗i,j : i < n}
(which may be seen as looking at a column in the space M) has dimension dimA for j > r. Since∑
Cj ⊆ B and the Cj ’s are disjoint, we have dimB ≥ (n − r) dimA ≥ (r − 2)(n − r) since A is the
annihilator of a space of dimension 2.
Now it remains to show that dim(B ∩ D) = dimB. To see this, it suffices to observe that every
functional e∗i,i and e∗i,j + e∗j,i involves a distinct basis element e∗i,j for which i ≤ j, whereas B is entirely
disjoint from the span of those elements.
A.2 Inversion algorithm for λ
Recall that λ : Fn2 × Fn2 → E is defined by λ(a, b)i,j = aibj + ajbi. We note that λ is symmetric
bilinear and ∀a, λ(a, a) = 0. As a consequence λ(a, b) = λ(a+ b, b) = λ(a, a+ b). Moreover λ(a, b) = 0
if and only if a, b are linearly related; indeed the image of λ(a, b) is the set of all determinants of 2× 2
submatrices of the 2× n matrix whose rows are a and b, i.e. the set of all 2-minors of the matrix.
As a consequence of the previous properties, by inverting λ, we mean recovering one of {a, b}, {a+
b, b}, {a, a + b} given λ(a, b), and provided λ(a, b) 6= 0 (otherwise any linearly dependent a, b is a
preimage). For this purpose we use the following algorithm. Consider the n × n matrix M such that
Mi,j = λ(a, b)i,j . LetRi denote the i-th row ofM , i.e.Rij = aibj+ajbi. Then observe thatRi = aib+bia.
Thus we see that M has rank 2, and in order to invert λ in the previous sense, we need only pick any
two linearly independent rows of M .
B Regarding the location of perturbation polynomials
For the sake of simplicity, in Section 5.1, we assumed that perturbation polynomials are contiguous. In
order to increase the security of the scheme one could propose to make the positions of perturbations
secret. However this would fail as the scheme would still be broken in practical time. Indeed, according
to our experiments, knowing 10 outputs of ASA among the 127 is enough to perform step 5 and quickly
recover the first affine layer Ax with a probability of 97% (100 trials with n = 127). Thus, as long
as there are less than 60 perturbations, one can perform the whole attack to retrieve the first affine
layer. Then, in order to retrieve the lines of (Az)−1 and Ay corresponding to unperturbed bits, one
need only solve deg(P ·G) = 4 where P is an affine combination of the n public polynomials and G is
an affine combination of χ. In practice we found this quadratic system to be easily solvable12 because
of the structure of the scheme. The missing lines can take any value as long as the resulting layers are
invertible, each choice determining the perturbation layer.
12 Due to an inefficient representation of polynomials in our implementation, we only performed this step for
n = 31. However, we found it to be faster than steps 1 and 2.
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